Incentivos no coercitivos para mantener el uso de plataformas de dos lados

Sergio León Álvarez Fernández

Econógrafos, Escuela de Economía from Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID

Abstract: In digital era, the two-sided platforms play an important role in the study of modern microeconomics. Currently, there is a lot of information in the literature about the competence, pricing, and market power that they have; nevertheless, little has been written about the mechanisms that provide platforms with different ways to maintain their survival. That is, in how to encourage users in both sides of the platform to use it and decide to transact on it. This article aims to show, by means of game theory, three mechanisms in which the use of platforms is a Nash equilibrium, and then to compare which of them -if any- produces better social outcomes when repeated indefinitely. The reader may observe that non-coercive incentives, also known as carrots, will be better to maintain the survival of platforms in the market.

Keywords: Two-sided platforms; mechanism design; incentive compatibility; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C73 D40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2021-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000176:022818

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