Screening Multiple Uninformed Experts

Francisco Barreras ()

No 15282, Documentos de Trabajo from Quantil

Abstract: Testing the validity of claims made by self-proclaimed experts can be impossible when testing them in isolation, even with infinite observations at the disposal of the tester. However, in a multiple expert setting it’s possible to design a contract that only informed experts accept and uninformed experts reject. The tester can pit competing theories against each other and take advantage of the uncertainty experts have about the other experts’ type. This contract will work even when there is only a single data point to evaluate.

Keywords: Self-proclaimed; isolation; Uninformed Experts; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9
Date: 2017-01-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000508:015282

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