Stability and the chain store paradox

Srihari Govindan

No 1992004, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: For the Kreps and Wilson version of Selten's Chain Store Game, every equilibrium of every stable set induces the same outcome. This unique outcome is the ne induced by the Kreps and Wilson solution.

Date: 1992-01-01
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Journal Article: Stability and the Chain Store Paradox (1995)
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