Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality

Vicky Barham, Robin Boadway, Maurice Marchand and Pierre Pestieau
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Maurice Marchand: CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

No 1992040, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The non-cooperative provision of public goods is analysed in the context of a two-stage game in which club size is determined endogenously. Equilibrium club size and voluntary labour supply are shown to be inefficient. The impact of optimally-chosen fiscal policies using simple instruments is studied. When agents do not derive nonpecuniary benefits from volunteer work, lump-sum grants can be used to implement the first-best equal treatment allocation but private provision is fully crowded out. Otherwise, it is found that simple fiscal instruments cannot implement the first-best equal-treatment allocation unless club size is directly regulated.

Date: 1992-06-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality (1997)
Working Paper: Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1992040

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