Technological linkages and efficient location of indivisible activities: Koopmans-Beckmann and Von Thünen unified

Masahisa Fujita and Jacques Thisse

No 1992043, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Consider a model à la Koopmans-Beckmann involving two indivisible and interactive firms, as well as a continuum of workers. Firm 1 uses labor, while firm 2 uses labor and good 1 produced by firm 1; both goods 1 and 2 can be exported their output but good 1 cannot be imported. The land capitalization process, based on workers' competition on a perfectly competitive land market, is used to design a noncooperative game betwccn firms 1 and 2. The equilibria of this game always exist and are socially optimal. Various extensions of the basic model are also discussed.

Date: 1992-08-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1992.html (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Technological Linkages and Efficient Location of Indivisible Activities: Koopmans - Beckmann and von Thunen Unified (1993)
Working Paper: Technological linkages and efficient location of indivisible activities: Koopmans -Beckmann and Von Thünen unified (1993)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1992043

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().