Monotonicity and the fair assignment solution

Ahmet Alkan (alkan@sabanciuniv.edu)

No 1992044, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Given any problem involving assignment of indivisible objects and a sum of money among individuals, there is a fair assignment (namely the minmax money assignment) which can be extended monotonically to a new fair assignment for any object added or person removed, and another (the maxmin value assignment) extendable similarly for any object removed or person added. This however is the extent of compatibility between fairness and monotonicity axioms in the assignment problem. No allocation other than the minmax money allocation is extendable. An analogue holds for the maxmin value allocation by example.

Date: 1992-06-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1992.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1992044

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS (alain.gillis@uclouvain.be).