Moral Hazard in Teams and Repeated Partnership: The Role of Information Quality

Claude d ASPREMONT () and Louis-André Gérard-Varet
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Claude d ASPREMONT: CORE and Département des Sciences Economiques, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Claude d'Aspremont

No 1993008, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We analyse the sharing of an uncertain joint output among risk-neutral members of a team whose actions are not observable. Adapting techniques used to treat the pure adverse selection problem to this team moral hazard problem, we define a first condition that is sufficient to implement a first best joint action and a second condition that is sufficient to implement. any joint action . These conditions hold generically. Finally we show ttw usefulness of such eonditions in repeated partnership with imperfect monitoring and prove a folk-theorem.

Date: 1993-02-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1993008

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