Knowledge at Equilibrium

Enrico Minelli and Heracles Polemarchakis

No 1993054, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash equilibrium profile of strategies information is essentially symemetric when the same profile is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information. We show that, at a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric, and their strategies are common knowledge.

JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-11-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1993054

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