Alternative Notions of Knowledge

Stephen Morris

No 1994002, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In a finite state world with subjective expected utility maximizers, there is an unambiguous notion of what it means to know event: an event is known if it is assigned probability one. But when should a non-expected utility maximizer be said to know an event? Consider a lexicographic expected utility maximizer. Does he know an event if it is assigned probability one by the first sets of beliefs, or only if it is assigned probability one by each of the lexicographic sequence of beliefs? This paper considers alternative definitions of knowledge in terms of preferences, and shows what these alternative notions imply in different non-expected utility settings. Definitions of knowledge in non-expected utility settings have been important in a number of recent papers.

Date: 1994-01-01
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