Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions

Robin Boadway, Nicolas Marceau and Maurice Marchand
Additional contact information
Nicolas Marceau: Universite Laval
Maurice Marchand: CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

No 1994010, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: A classic argument in the theory of crime is that optimal enforcement policy should involve maximal sanctions and no crime. Yet this is rarely observed in the real world. We argue that one reason for this has to do with the time inconsistency of such a policy. If sanctions are only applied after a crime has been committed, the enforcement authority may be reluctant to impose a high sanction since it will no longer have any deterrent effect. We show in a simple one period setting that if the enforcement authority can commit to its announced sanctions, the classic result is obtained. However, if the enforcement authority cannot commit, a minimal sanction with no deterrence is obtained. These extreme outcomes can be avoided in a setting in which crimes and enforcement occur repeatedly and the authority is able to build a reputation.

Date: 1994-01-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions (1996)
Working Paper: Time-consistent criminal sanctions (1996)
Working Paper: Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions (1993)
Working Paper: Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1994010

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