Deriving Correlated Equilibrium as the Stable Standard of behavior of a Social Situation: A Note

Indrajit Ray ()

No 1994011, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We study the concept of correlated equilibrium within the framework of social situations, and give an interpretation of the notion of mediated equilibrium. We find the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior (088B) of an appropriately defined situation is nothing but the set of correlated equilibria. We generalize this situation in a natural way to accommodate coalitional deviations, and thus get a new refinement of the set of correhtted equilibrium, as the unique OSSB of this generalized situation. We analyze our concept using several examples.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-03-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1994011

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