"Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games: A Comment on Dubey-Shubik (1978)

Tito Cordella and Jean Gabszewicz

No 1994042, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all the assumptions as in Dubey-Shubik (1988), for which the trivial Nash Equilibrium is the unique equilibrium point of the associated market game. From this example, we are led to propose an argument, related to the intensity of competition, explaining why there could be no trade at an equilibrium point.

Date: 1994-09-01
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