Social Protection and Political Competition

Jean Gabszewicz and Tanguy van Ypersele

No 1994057, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper analyses how the level of social protection is determined when its choice depends on political competition. First this is done under autarky. Then the analysis is extended to take account of the existence of an international capital market. We show that social protection never increases under international competition and, in several circumstances, drastically decreases.

Date: 1994-10-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social protection and political competition (1996)
Working Paper: Social protection and political competition (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1994057

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