Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transition

Rabah Amir ()

No 1995009, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: \Ve consider a discounter stochastic game of common-property capital accumulation with nonsymetric players. bounded Due-period extraction capacities, and a transition law satisfying a general strong convexity condition. We show that the infinite-horizon problem has a Markov-stationary (subgame-perfect) equilibrium and that every finite horizon transaction has a unique Markovian equilibrium, hoth in consumption functions which are continuous, non decreasing and have all slopes bounded above by 1. Unlike previous results in strategic dynamic models, these properties are reminiscent of the corresponding optimal growth model.

JEL-codes: C73 O41 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-01-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1995.html (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions (1996)
Working Paper: Continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1995009

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().