International Negotiations on Acid Rains in Northern Europe: A Discrete Time Iterative Process
Philippe Toint and
Henry Tulkens ()
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Marc Germain: CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Philippe Toint: Departement de Mathématiques, Facultés universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur
No 1995056, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
This paper proposes a dynamic model of international negotiations on transboundary pollution. This approach is characterized by a discrete time formulation ( at variance with the continuous model of Kaitale et al.(1995)) and by a suitable formulation of the local information assumption on cost and damage functions: at each stage of the negotiation, the parties assign the best possible cooperative state, given the available information, as an objective for the next stage. It is shown that the resulting sequences of states converges to a Pareto optimum in a finite number of stages. Furthermore, a financial transfers structure is formulated, which guarantees that the desired sequence of states is rational for the involved parties, at the individual as well as the coalition level.The concepts are applied in a numerical simulation of the SO2 transboundary pollution problem related to acid rains in Northern Europe.
Keywords: acid rain; international negociations; financial transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D78 F02 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: International negotiations on acid rains in Northern Europe: a discrete time iterative process (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1995056
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