Nash-Walras equilibria

Sayantan Ghosal and Heracles Polemarchakis
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Heracles Polemarchakis: CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

No 1995080, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: At a Nash - Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, NashWalras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate but Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained Pareto suboptimal: a transfer of revenue need not suffice for a Pareto improvement in welfare.

Keywords: Nash; Walras; equilibrium; determinacy; optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D60 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-12-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Nash-Walras equilibria (1997)
Working Paper: Nash-Walras equilibria (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1995080

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