A Remark on the Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form

Indrajit Ray ()

No 1996017, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: If a solution (on a closed [exp.2] family of games) satisfies dummy axiom (DUM) and independence of irrelevant strategies (lIS) then it also satisfies consistency (CONS) (proposition 2.21, Peleg and Tijs, 1996). The converse of this proposition is not true: CONS implies neither DUM nor lIS as shown in two simple examples, using coalition- proof Nash equilibrium. However, CONS implies weak dummy axiom (WDUM) which can replace DUM in the above proposition.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-05-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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