Voting on Tariff and Retaliation

Tanguy van Ypersele

No 1996030, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the trade war between two large countries when the trade policy is decided through majority voting. We show how the trade war equilibrium depends on the median voter production factor relative endowment. We compare this equilibrium to the one analyzed by Johnson where the trade policy is driven by an utilitarian benevolent dictator.

Date: 1996-05-01
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Journal Article: Voting on Tariff and Retaliation (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1996030

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