N-Person Sequential Bargaining with Endogenous Procedure

Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 1996042, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this note, we consider a negotiation model wherein a simultaneous voting game, which endogenizes the choice of the bargaining procedure, is introduced. That is, in stage 1 of the negotiation (i.e. before starting the bargaining), the N [greater then or equal] 3 players vote to decide which procedure (clockwise or anticlockwise) with exit will be adopted during the bargaining. Then, in stage 2 of the negotiation, the players bargain over the cake following the chosen bargaining process. We show that the more patient the playe", the more likely the anticlockwise bargaining procedure will be the out- come of the voting game. Note that, in comparison to the clockwise procedure, the anticlockwise procedure leads to a less fair bargaining outcome.

Keywords: bargaining; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-09-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1996042

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