Trials and Errors: PLEA Bargaining as a Learning Device

Bernardo Bortolotti
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Bernardo Bortolotti: Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium

No 1996049, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomplete information game. It is shown that, for a given parameter configuration, there exists a Bayesian equilibrium with perfect screening of the guilty defendant. In the repeated game, a prosecutor who systematically resorts to the informative strategy and updates her beliefs in a Bayesian fashion asymptotically learns the "truth" in terms of proportion of guilty parties in the whole population of the indictees.

Keywords: Plea Bargain; Litigation; Bayesian Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D89 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-10-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1996049

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