Relative utilitarianism an improved axiomatisation

Amrita Dhillon () and Jean-François Mertens

No 1996055, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakened versions of Arrow's axioms has a unique solution. "Relative Utilitarianism" consists of first normalising individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities between 0 and 1 and then summing them. This axiomatisation largely supersedes the one in Dhillon and Mertens (1993).

Keywords: Axiomatisation; Social Choice; Social Welfare Function; Utilitarianism; Welfarism; Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem; Expected Utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-11-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1996055

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