“Cav u” and the dual game

Bernard De Meyer and Dinah Rosenberg

No 1997048, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We give an alternative proof of a theorem of Aumann and Maschler [1] that characterizes the limit of the values of finitely repeated games with lack of information on one side as the concavification of the value of the game where none of the players has any information.

Date: 1997-07-01
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Working Paper: 'Cav u' and the Dual Game (1999)
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