Robustness of the coordinating role of a redundant security

Chiaki Hara ()

No 1997057, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The coordinating role of a redundant security is its role in markets with transaction costs to coordinate different consumers’ security demands so as to clear all security markets and, simultaneously, attain a given commodity allocation. The purpose of this paper is to prove that, under some conditions, the coordinating role of a redundant security is a robust property with respect to perturbations in utility functions, initial endowments, and transaction costs.

Keywords: Security markets; transaction costs; redundant securities; general equilibrium theory; robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D52 G11 G12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-08-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1997.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1997057

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().