Core-theoretic and political stability of international agreements on transfrontier pollution
Sergio Currarini () and
Henry Tulkens ()
No 1997093, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
International agreements on transfrontier pollution issues require ap- proval by domestic political institutions. In this paper we employ a voting game theoretic model to characterize the stability of such agreements when each country’s participation is conditioned upon a domestic ratification vote. To describe pre-treaty or no treaty situ- ations, we propose a concept of (noncooperative) political equilibrium, and prove its existence. Then, we show that the set of cooperative joint policies (yielding a treaty) that are ratified by all countries is nonempty. Moreover, in our model, the unique agreement so ratified corresponds to the ratio equilibrium allocation of the international economy with the noncooperative equilibrium allocation as initial endowment.
Keywords: voting games; core; international cooperation; pollution; political equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1997093
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