Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution

Salvador Barberà (), Michael Maschler () and Jonathan Shalev ()
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Michael Maschler: Department of Mathematics and Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

No 1998022, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for k periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is sufficient for admission, and voters can support as many candidates as theywish; voters assess the value of the streams of agents with whom they share the society, while they belong to it. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of theproblem: the vote for friends may be postponed, and it may be advantageous to vote for enemies. We discuss the existence of different types of equilibria in pure strategies and point out interesting equilibria in mixed strategies.

Keywords: Linear programming; interior-point methods; target following methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution (2001)
Working Paper: Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1998022

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