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On Nash equivalence classes of generic normal form games

Fabrizio Germano ()

No 1998033, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We introduce a procedure that uses basic topological characteristics of equilibrium correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts, to define broad equivalence classes of finite generic games in normal form. The proposed procedure is viewed as a potentially useful way of both organizing the underlying spaces of games as well as of comparing different equilibrium concepts with each other. The focus of the paper is mainly on equivalence classes induced by the Nash equilibrium concept. However, equivalence classes induced by the concepts of rationalizability, iterated dominance and correlated equilibrium are also considered.

Keywords: non-cooperative games; classification and equivalence classes; geometry of equilibrium correspondences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-05-01
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