Subgame perfection in a “divided government” model

Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

No 1999028, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Purely non-cooperative principles, as iterated dominance and backward induction, explain divided government.

Date: 1999-05-01
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