A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy

Francesco De Sinopoli

No 1999060, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997) conforms to backward induction rationality. In this note we remark that it does not conform to forward induction rationality.

Keywords: Voting games; refinements of Nash equilibrium; citizen-candidate; forward induction; Mertens’ stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-11-01
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Journal Article: A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy (2004)
Working Paper: A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1999060

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