A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

No 2000037, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficients equal to their share of seats, only a two-party voting equilibrium basically exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal's model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. This result cannot be extended to a general outcome function but, however, when the policy is determined by the two leading parties, in pure strategies, only two-party equilibria can emerge. Analogous result holds for coalitions of parties.

Keywords: Voting; Proportional Rule; Nash Equilibria. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria (2007)
Working Paper: A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria (2003)
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