Price symmetry in a duopoly with congestion

Ori Haimanko () and Richard Steinberg

No 2000056, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We show that in a duopoly operating in a congested market, with a general congestion function and an arbitrary distribution of consumer disutility for congestion, there cannot exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. We also show that whenever an equilibrium does exist it is unique. Closed form expressions for the symmetric equilibrium prices and profits are provided.

Keywords: duopolistic pricing; congestion; symmetric equilibria; covered market. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2000.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2000056

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().