Strategic multilateral exchange and taxes

Jean Gabszewicz and Lisa Grazzini

No 2000063, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This contribution investigates the effictiveness and welfare implications of fiscal policies in a context of multilateral trade, when traders behave strategically. The present approach deals simultaneously with two aspects of fiscal policies: collecting resources for redistributive purposes and correcting distortions related to imperfectly competitive behaviour.

Keywords: imperfect competition; taxation; strategic market game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 H30 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2000.html (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic multilateral exchange and taxes (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2000063

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().