Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko (), Ram Orzach and Aner Sela

No 2001007, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We showthat the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Additionally, it is shown that bidder's information advantage over others is rewarded in sophisticated equilibria.

Keywords: common-value second-price auctions; differential information; connectedness with respect to common value; dominance solvability; sophisticated equilibria; information advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2001.html (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().