Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies

Gaël Giraud and Céline Rochon

No 2001019, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We define a newstrategic equilibrium concept - called strong collusion-proof contract - designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, selfenforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions. We then construct a strategic market mechanism which, for quasi-linear economies, is such that its strong collusion-proof contracts generically induce the incentive compatible interim efficent allocations. Moreover, it is such that these allocations can be achieved by strong collusion-proof contracts. We show that the internally consistent extension of the strong collusion-proof contracts generically yields the same set of efficent allocations.

Keywords: coalition-proofness; Bayesian implementation; communication equilibrium; interim efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies (2003)
Working Paper: Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001019

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