Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

No 2001029, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium, if the electorate is large. Moreover, we show that there is an effect of sincere voters' behavior on the equilibrium outcome, for which strategic voters cannot fully adjust.

Date: 2001-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001029

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