Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in coalitional games
T. Hokari and
Özgür Kıbrıs ()
No 2001030, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
In the problems of choosing "aspirations" for coalitional games, we study two axioms, "MW-consistency" and "converse MW-consistency",introduced by Moldovanu and Winter (1994). We mainly consider two domains: thedomain of all NTU games and the domain of all TU games. In particular, westudy which subsolutions of the aspiration correspondence satisfy MW-consistency and/or converse MWconsistency. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of the aspiration kernel and the aspiration nucleolus on the domain of all TU games.
Keywords: aspirations; coalitional games; consistency; converse consistency; reduced games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001030
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