Monopoly versus R&D-integrated duopoly

Rabah Amir (), Niels Nannerup, Anna Stepanova and Elina Eguiazarova
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Cartwright

No 2001051, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In the standard two-stage framework of R&D/product market competition, this paper provides a performance comparison between monopoly and the cartelized research joint venture, using two well-known models based on different versions of the R&D spillover process. According to the model with a wider scope of application, monopoly always leads to a higher propensity for R&D and, when R&D costs are low, to the best overall market performance. The results also allow for a comparison between the two underlying models of strategic R&D.

Keywords: oligopolistic R&D; spillover process; research joint ventures; R&D cartel. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monopoly versus R&D‐integrated Duopoly (2002)
Working Paper: Monopoly versus R&D-integrated duopoly (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001051

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