The procedural value

Geoffroy de Clippel

No 2002016, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We propose a single-valued solution that extends both the consistent Shapley value of Maschler and Owen (1989) and Raiffa's discrete bargaining solution to a large class of NTU games. Though not axiomatized, the solution is motivated via the Nash program. In this respect, we follow an approach that is similar to the one initiated by Hart and Mas-Collel (1996).

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-09
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