The museum pass game and its value

Victor Ginsburgh and Israel Zang

No 2002041, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We discuss a subscription game in which service providers (e.g., museums)team up in offering a limited time subscription or access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the subscription income among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered,the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form.

Date: 2002-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: The museum pass game and its value (2003)
Working Paper: The museum pass game and its value (2003)
Working Paper: The museum pass game and its value (2003)
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