Balanced Bayesian mechanisms

Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer () and Louis-André Gérard-Varet

No 2002048, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We present a new condition on beliefs that guarantee the Bayesian implementability of all efficient social decision rules. We show that this condition is easy to verify and is both more interpretable and more general than the conditions that are found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.

Date: 2002-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: Balanced Bayesian mechanisms (2004)
Working Paper: Balanced Bayesian mechanisms (2004)
Working Paper: Balanced Bayesian Mechanisms (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2002048

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