Two-person bargaining with verifiable information

Geoffroy de Clippel and Enrico Minelli

No 2002063, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We study Myerson's incomplete information bargaining solution under the assumption of verifiable types. For the case of an informed principal, in which one individual has all the bargaining power, we provide exact characterizations both from the non cooperative and from the cooperative perspective. We then show that the axiomatic characterization can be extended to the case in which both individuals have some bargaining power. Myerson's approach also suggests a new definition of the core that refines Wilson's coarse core. We argue that this refinement captures an important aspect of negotiation at the interim stage.

Keywords: bargaining; incomplete information; informed principal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Two-person bargaining with verifiable information (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2002063

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