Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation

Emanuele Bacchiega

No 2002076, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This article intends to apply the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and to study its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the resulting wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of distortion that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricing and quality choice.

Keywords: vertical differentiation; workers’ skills; wage bargaining; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J00 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation (2007)
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