Invariance with respect to re-evaluations of coalitional power

Geoffroy de CLIPPEL

No 2003056, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: If x is a reasonable agreement in a game V , then so should it remain in the associated game Vx where the coalitions can buy up the cooperation of non-members by 'paying' them according to x. This new stability property called 'Invariance with respect to re-evaluations of coalitional power' (IRCP) allows to characterize the core as the largest solution specifying feasible allocations that are individually rational. In addition, a natural adaptation of IRCP allows to elegantly characterize the inner core for NTU games with convex and smooth feasible sets.

Keywords: reduced game property; core; inner core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07
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