PAYG pension systems with capital mobility

Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau and Gwenael Piaser (gwenael.piaser@ipag.fr)

No 2004031, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Consider an overlapping generation growth model involving identical countries whose fiscal policy reduces to a pay-as-you-go system with flat rate benefits and uniform payroll tax rate. In autarky, the tax rate is chosen so as to achieve a compromise between intragenerational and intergenerational redistribution. Assume now that there is capital mobility in a setting where national government act more cooperatively. This paper studies how the tax is affected by this combination of capital mobility and non cooperation. It shows that the tax rate increases and henceforth capital accumulation decreases as the number of countries involved increases.

Keywords: pay-as-you-go pension; tax competition; capital mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 H73 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2004.html (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: PAYG pension systems with capital mobility (2006)
Working Paper: PAYG pension systems with capital mobility (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2004031

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS (alain.gillis@uclouvain.be).