Competition over piratable goods

Paul Belleflamme and Pierre Picard

No 2004055, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly horizon tally differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the pricing game played by n producers of information goods. We show thereby how the producers' attitudes towards piracy are interdependent and evolve with the relative attractiveness of copies.

Keywords: information goods; piracy; copyright; pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 L13 L82 L86 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2004.html (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition over Piratable Goods (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2004055

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().