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The egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public projects

Anna Bogomolnaia, Michel Le Breton, Alexey Savvateev () and Shlomo Weber

No 2005024, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to exist.

Keywords: jurisdictions; stable partitions; public projects; egalitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The Egalitarian Sharing Rule in the Provision of Public Projects (2005)
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