Market integration and strike activity

Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2005036, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectlycomp etitive industries. We investigate the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the maximum delayin reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of reciprocal intra-industrytrade, an increase in product market integration will decrease the maximal delayin reaching an agreement. However, markets opening up for competition have an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delaytime in reaching an agreement.

Keywords: economic integration; product market competition; wage bargaining; strike activity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 F15 J50 J52 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: Market integration and strike activity (2010)
Working Paper: Market integration and strike activity (2010)
Working Paper: Market Integration and Strike Activity (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2005036

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