Political information acquisition for social exchange

Gani Aldashev

No 2006020, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We model political information acquisition in large elections, where the probability of being piv- otal is negligible. Our model builds on the assumption that informed citizens enjoy discussing politics with other informed citizens. The resulting information acquisition game exhibits strate- gic complementarities. We find that information acquisition depends negatively on the social distance between citizens. Next, we build an application of the model to the distributive politics game. Equilibrium policies are biased towards regions/groups with lower social distance between citizens. Finally, we present evidence for the basic model's main prediction based on the data from the 2000 U.S. National Elections Study. Citizens with a shorter residence span (thus having a less developed local social network, i.e. facing a larger social distance) acquire significantly less political information than the otherwise similar long-term residents.

Keywords: information acquisition; social interactions; global games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political Information Acquisition for Social Exchange (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2006020

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