Farsightedly stable networks

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2006092, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairto a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well wise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g G

Keywords: networks; farsighted; stability; pairwise; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C70 D20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Farsightedly stable networks (2009)
Working Paper: Farsightedly stable networks (2009)
Working Paper: Farsightedly stable networks (2006)
Working Paper: Farsightedly stable networks (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2006092

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