Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization
Jean Hindriks (),
Susana Peralta () and
Shlomo Weber ()
No 2006109, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
The paper considers a model of a federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. The regions' choices determine the allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme. This framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes (Boadway and Flatters, 1982, and Weingast, 2006). We show that tax competition distorts (downwards) public investments and that the equalization grants discourage public investments with a little effect on equilibrium taxes. However, the equalization schemes remain beneficial for the federation and, provided that the degree of asymmetry is small, for each region as well.
Keywords: heterogeneous regions; ﬁscal federalism; ﬁscal equalization; public investments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H23 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization (2008)
Working Paper: Competing in Taxes and Investment under Fiscal Equalization (2007)
Working Paper: Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2006109
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