Efficient access pricing and endogenous market structure

Kaniska Dam, Axel Gautier () and Manipushpak Mitra

No 2007004, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We analyse a (differentiated good) industry where an incumbent firm owns a network good (essential input) and faces potential competition in the (downstream) retail market. Unlike the traditional approach, we consider a scenario where the decision to compete or not in the downstream segment is endogenous, and this decision depends on the particular mechanism designed by the utilitarian regulator. We assume that the technology of the potential entrant is private information. We derive the efficient (Ramsey) prices and access charge taking the impact of a non-discriminatory mechanism on entry decision into account. We assert that the optimal pricing formula must include a Ramsey term that is inversely related to the "modified" superelasticity of the retail good under consideration. We further show, under unknown cost, that there might be "excess" or "too little" entry compared to the socially optimal level.

Keywords: non-discriminatory access; endogenous competition; modified superelasticity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L11 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient Access Pricing and Endogenous Market Structure (2008)
Working Paper: Efficient Access Pricing and Endogenous Market Structure (2007)
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